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I. INTRODUCTION

An American drone pilot thousands of miles away from
Afghanistan sees a tempting target on his computer screen. Thanks
to the Predator drone's video capabilities,' the pilot is treated to the
spectacle of a known Taliban commander and over a dozen other
armed men greeting a dozen tribesmen, who are also armed to the
teeth. Everyone depicted on-screen has a gun. The pilot fires the
Predator's missile. Shortly thereafter, he confirms the deaths of thirty
Taliban fighters and associated forces.
While the facts above, particularly the presence of the known
Taliban commander, tend to show that the strike was consistent with
the laws of armed conflict (LOAC), this Article argues that
international law should require more. Suppose, for example, that the
Taliban commander and the tribesmen, while currently fighting the
United States and President Hamid Karzai's regime installed in
Afghanistan after the post-September 11 U.S. intervention, were
conducting a jirga-a meeting with elders-to decide whether they
should make peace with the Karzai regime. Or suppose that the
commander was conducting a jirga with villagers to determine
property rights. If the villagers left before the strike, the strike
against the Taliban fighters would similarly be legal under LOAC.
However, a strike would devalue the jirga, a time-honored means of
dispute resolution 2 in a country that has seen its fill of war for more
than three decades.
The scenarios just described are not purely hypothetical. Some
evidence suggests that informal negotiators have been either targeted
or become collateral damage in U.S. drone strikes. 3 This evidence

1.
For a discussion of drones' technical capabilities, see Michael W. Lewis,
Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield, 47 TEX. INT'L L.J. 293, 296-98 (2012). Cf.
Michael W. Lewis & Emily Crawford, Drones and Distinction: How IHL Encouraged
the Use of Drones, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1127, 1133-34 (2013).
2.
See Christina Jones-Pauly & Neamat Nojumi, BalancingRelations Between
Society and State: Legal Steps Toward National Reconciliationand Reconstruction of
Afghanistan, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 825, 836 (2004) ("The core of the unofficial or 'informal'
legal system is what is known . . . as the local Jirga . . . .").

See Robert F. Worth, Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Hazards of Drone
3.
Strikes Face Rare Public Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2013, at Al (discussing the
death of a cleric who opposed Al Qaeda in an air strike that apparently targeted three
Al Qaeda members with whom the cleric was meeting and the death of Adnan Qadhi,
an Al Qaeda member who had recently acted as a mediator between the Yemeni
government and other militants); David Zucchino, Study Slams Drone Use in Pakistan,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2012, at A3 (reporting on a strike in Afghanistan on March 17,
2011, that killed forty-two people attending a jirga to settle a dispute about a chromite
mine; according to a report by programs at Stanford and NYU law schools, only four
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might be unreliable. However, if it is accurate, even in part, that
should be a concern even for those who support the broad outlines of
the U.S. targeting strategy. 4 Responding to this concern, this Article
argues that informal negotiators from an armed non-state group
should receive an "implied safe conduct," not only shielding them
from targeting but also imposing an affirmative duty on a state party
to a noninternational armed conflict (NIAC) to ensure their safety. 5
The expansion of implied safe conduct suggested here reflects
what can be called a "stewardship model" for third-party states, such
as the United States, that participate in NIACs in host countries,
such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, or Yemen. A stewardship
model, which this author has also advanced in another recent piece
dealing with the interaction of American and international law, 6
seeks to reconcile LOAC and international human rights law in order
to promote the preservation of indigenous governance and the
transition to civil order in the host state. 7 Preserving informal
known members of the Taliban attended; according to the United States, all of those
killed were militants).
4.
See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Keynote
Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The
Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l1/releases/remarks/139119.htm (speaking to the current legal
challenges faced by the Obama Administration, including the legal issues surrounding
targeting); cf. Peter Margulies, The Fog of War Reform: Structure and Change in the
Law of Armed Conflict After Sept. 11, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1417, 1471-77 (2012) (citing
public remarks by former State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh and others);
Nicholas Rostow, The Laws of War and the Killing of Suspected Terrorists:False Starts,
Rabbit Holes, and Dead Ends, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 1215, 1222-28 (2011) (praising
Koh's view that the 9/11 attacks triggered the United States' right of self-defense and
targeting in foreign countries, while criticizing opponents of U.S. policy on targeted
killing as imposing unworkable standards). Compare John C. Dehn & Kevin Jon
Heller, Debate: Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar al-Aulaqi, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 175, 189-91 (2011) (supporting the targeting of al-Aulaqi), with id. at
183,'196 (arguing that targeted killings are generally impermissible).
The concerns that drive this approach harmonize with recent work by
5.
Ganesh Sitaraman on counterinsurgency. See generally GANESH SITARAMAN, THE
COUNTERINSURGENTS' CONSTITUTION: LAW IN THE AGE OF SMALL WARS (2013). This
Article is more specific than Sitaraman's work on targeting, and also suggests a
different approach, one that avoids across-the-board constraints on commanders'
discretion.
See generally Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law:
6.
Presidential Stewardship, ProsecutorialDiscretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94
B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2215255
(presenting a new stewardship theory as it applies to the Obama Administration and
immigration law).
The interaction of LOAC and human rights law has become a pressing
7.
issue in the wake of two recent decisions by the European Court of Human Rights. See
Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1092 (holding that, absent express
derogation, the state violated human rights law by detaining an individual in Iraq in
the course of its role as part of the UN-sponsored force); Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom,
2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1093 (holding that the state's control of territory in Iraq pursuant to
a UN Security Council resolution imposed a duty to observe the European Convention
on Human Rights, including provisions on the right to life and the investigation of
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dispute-resolution processes is one component of stewardship.
Discounting the need for this preservation may increase kill rates in
the short term but will leave a host state unstable in the long term,
undermining the rationale for the third-party state's intervention.
Stewardship duties are hardly unknown in LOAC. The law of
occupation, which typically kicks in after the conclusion of an armed
conflict, has been described as a framework of "temporary
trusteeship."8 The trusteeship of occupation must preserve the laws
of the occupied state; this Article argues that informal disputeresolution processes such as jirgas and shuras9 are part of that law.
The stewardship approach builds on this analogy to occupation
law. As lex ferenda, not lex lata, it emerges from a backdrop of respect
for negotiation and cultural dispute-resolution processes. Negotiators
have historically received protection under LOAC and international
law.' 0 Typically, that protection has taken one of two forms. Protection
can entail an express, affirmative, and specific grant of safe conduct to
particular individuals. Alternatively, it can entail a treaty-based grant
that has arguably ripened into customary international law (CIL) for
particular classes of individuals, vehicles, or vessels, such as
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) personnel, medical
transports, and alien merchants."
However, logic and policy support extending implied safe
conducts to informal negotiators who distinguish themselves through
a symbol that reflects their activities and thereby provides targeters
with adequate guidance. First, the traditional approach is rooted in

incidents involving the use of lethal force against civilians); cf. James Farrant, Is the
Extra-TerritorialApplication of the Human Rights Act Really Justified?, 9 INT'L CRIM.
L. REV. 833 (2009) (discussing previous decisions in each case that considered the
interaction of LOAC and human rights); Marko Milanovic, Norm Conflict in
InternationalLaw: Whither Human Rights?, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 69, 79-83
(2009) (discussing a. House of Lords' decision in Al-Jedda, suggesting that human
rights law may require the introduction of procedural safeguards for detention, even
when such safeguards are not required under LOAC principles); Barbara Miltner,
Revisiting ExtraterritorialityAfter Al-Skeini: The ECHR and Its Lessons, 33 MICH. J.
INVL L. 693, 697-99 (2012) (discussing the Al-Jedda and Al-Skeini cases).
8.
See Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation:Applying the Laws
of War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580, 585-86 (2006) (discussing the
authority and responsibilities of an occupying power inder a temporary trusteeship).
Shuras are councils that resemble jirgas but often operate on a broader
9.
scale. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
10.
See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (describing safe
conduct and diplomatic immunity within the history of the Alien Tort Statute); Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1666-67 (2013) (same); J. Andrew Kent,
A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 525
(2007) (discussing the congressional protection of safe conducts during the founding era
following the enactment of the U.S. Constitution).
11.
See Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 830, 874-75 (2006) (discussing express and implied safe conducts).
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the Westphalian regime of the nation-state. 12 It fails to do justice to
the more complex, asymmetric warfare of the twenty-first century in
which powerful and sophisticated states like the United States face
off against non-state actors who often invoke traditional cultural
norms to gain traction with the civilian population in weak states,
such as Pakistan and Afghanistan.' 3 Failing to extend safe conducts
beyond consensual grants could prolong modern NIACs, posing
tension with the rationale for LOAC.
The implied-safe conduct approach also gathers support from
analogy to human rights concepts such as cultural property.
Indigenous dispute-resolution processes lack the concrete nature of
artifacts and other cultural property expressly protected by
international law. However, they ire at least as important to the
communities they serve. Moreover, like the connections to ancestral
land protected in cases such as Moiwana Village v. Suriname,14 once
ties to dispute-resolution processes are broken, restoring those ties is
an arduous and sometimes futile endeavor.
Stewardship and the implied-safe conduct concept improve on the
leading approaches for dealing with targeting issues. Many scholars
accept what this Article will refer to as the "preemptive model," which
views LOAC as lex specialis-a body of law with specific rules that
"preempts the field," rendering other sources of law inoperative or
inapplicable."s The preemptive model rejects constraints on targeting
beyond distinction, proportionality, and precaution, unless customary
or treaty law requires these safeguards, as it does for diplomats and
medical transports. 16 The preemptive model does not preclude

12.
A number of scholars have discussed the limits of the view that states are
the sole sources of international law. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the
Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 711 (2008) (distinguishing between the application of international
humanitarian law to state actors and non-state actors); Anthea Roberts & Sandesh
Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by NonstateActors: EngagingArmed Groups in the Creation
of InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. 107 (2012); cf. Jordan J. Paust,
Nonstate Actor Participationin InternationalLaw and the Pretense of Exclusion, 51 VA.
J. INT'L L. 977 (2011) (arguing that international law has often allowed space for nonstate actors, albeit without systematic acknowledgment of this fact).
13.
See, e.g., U.S. ARMY, COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL § 1-1-39 (2006)
[hereinafter COIN MANUAL], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf
(providing general background information on insurgencies, including different
approaches to mobilization such as the cultural approach).
14.
See Moiwana Village v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, T 43 (June 15, 2005) (explaining how
the members of Moiwana village were unable to return to their ancestral lands after
being displaced by the armed forces of Suriname).
15.
See Michael N. Schmitt, Investigating Violations of International Law in
Armed Conflict, 2 HARV. NAT'L SECURTY J. 31, 53-54 (2011) (noting that lex specialis
can prevail over lex generalis when in conflict).
16.
See, e.g., Louise Doswald-Beck, The San Remo Manual on International
Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 192, 202, 206 (1995)
(noting that medical vessels are specially exempt from attack).
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heightened safeguards but generally places them within the realm of
prudential measures adopted at the option of the attacking state
through rules of engagement (ROE).' 7
The "rival approach," which will be called the "protective
conception," aims to more broadly constrain targeting. The protective
school requires across-the-board constraints on targeting beyond the
requirements of the jus in bello principles of distinction and
proportionality.' 8 For example, the protective approach requires a
quantum of care in the avoidance of civilian casualties that goes
beyond reasonableness, approaching strict liability.' 9
Both the preemptive and protective models have faults.20 The
preemptory model risks giving in to the myopia that occasionally
afflicts commanders who, in the fog of war, can make decisions that

17.
For an informed and insightful discussion of the tactical directive that
governs members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan,
see Chris Jenks, Agency of Risk: The Competing Balance Between Protecting Military
Forces and the Civilian Population During Counterinsurgency Operations in
Afghanistan, in

COUNTERINSURGENCY

LAW:

NEW DIRECTIONS

IN ASYMMETRIC

WARFARE 108, 114-18 (William C. Banks ed., 2013).
The principles of distinction and proportionality are inscribed in treaty law
18.
and are also viewed as CIL. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug.
12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, pt.
IV, art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I] (stating
the duty of conflicting parties to distinguish between civilian populations and
combatants); id. art. 51(5)(b) (prohibiting attacks causing harm to civilians that are
"excessive," given the "concrete and direct military advantage anticipated").
See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
19.
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 154-55 (1977) (arguing that the principle of proportionality

provides insufficient protection; instead, an attacker must "minimize [harm to
civilians] . . . accepting costs to himself"); Avishai Margalit & Michael Walzer, Israel:
Civilians and Combatants, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 14, 2009, available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/may/14/israel-civilians-combatants/
(discussing protections afforded to civilians in the context of Israel); David Luban, Risk
Taking and Force Protection, in READING WALZER (Itzhak Benbaji & Naomi Sussman
eds., Routledge, forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1855263
(analyzing Walzer's argument in Just and Unjust Wars concerning minimizing harm to
civilians); cf. Paul W. Kahn, The Paradoxof Riskless Warfare, 22(3) PHIL. & PUB. POL'Y
Q. 2, 4 (Summer 2002) ("Without the imposition of mutual risk, warfare is not war at
all."). Sitaraman seconds this narrowing of proportionality's leeway for commanders.
See SITARAMAN, supra note 5, at 49-50 (arguing that the evaluation of compliance with
proportionality should consider the "backlash" generated by otherwise legal strikes).
Stewardship rejects this general narrowing impulse as unworkable. See Peter
Margulies, Valor's Vices: Against a State Duty to Risk Forces in Armed Conflict, in

COUNTERINSURGENCY LAW, supra note 17, at 87, 90-94 (discussing the soundness of
protective theorists' vision).
20.
Cf. Christopher Greenwood, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Conflict or Convergence?, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 491, 500 (2010) (rejecting the

'ne'er the twain shall meet' theory" in which "[h]uman rights are for peacetime;
humanitarian law applies in war"); Monica Hakimi, A Functional Approach to
Targetingand Detention, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1365, 1373-85 (2012) (noting the flaws of
the "rigid domain" approach that pegs protections afforded prospective targets or
detainees to the classification of the situation as either an armed conflict or a law
enforcement).
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prolong conflicts. 21 On the other hand, the protective model places
unrealistic burdens on commanders to avoid collateral damage. Going
beyond the reasonableness standard that has marked compliance
with the principle of proportionality, the protective concept subjects
commanders to hindsight bias. 22 The quest for perfection at the heart
of the protective vision is incompatible with the exigencies of armed
conflict. Insisting on such a rigid standard will have one of two ill
effects: it will either impair commanders' war-fighting capabilities or
yield wholesale disregard of LOAC norms. 23 The stewardship
approach, including expanding implied safe conducts, is a third way,
which incentivizes greater accuracy where the stakes are highest
while rejecting across-the-board restrictions on targeting that place
undue burdens on command discretion.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part II discusses informal
dispute resolution and notes the importance of informal dispute
resolution in certain societies where third-party counterinsurgencies
are ongoing. 24 Part III provides evidence that targeting by the United
States has had an adverse impact on informal dispute resolution,
although it concedes that the exact nature and extent of that impact
is unclear. Part IV outlines the stewardship model and the legal
support for an implied-safe conduct theory. It then sketches the
theory's operation. This Part also includes discussion of the
consequences of the implied-safe conduct approach for two new types
of war fighting: drone signature strikes and autonomous systems in
which computers make certain decisions without ex ante human
review. Part V discusses some objections, including the concern that
the implied-safe conduct approach, like the protective model, unduly
constrains commanders' decisions.

21.
See Margulies, The Fog of War Reform, supra note 4, at 1445-56
(discussing the temporal judgment of commanders and how they may be biased toward
short-term benefits).

22.
See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 95, 95 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000)
(noting that maxims such as "hindsight . .. is '20/20"' indicate that "[1]earning how the
story ends . . . [distorts] our perception of what could have been predicted"); Neal J.

Roese, Twisted Pair: Counterfactual Thinking and the Hindsight Bias, in

BLACKWELL

HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 258, 260-61 (Derek J. Koehler &
Nigel Harvey eds., 2004) ("Hindsight bias is ... the tendency to believe that an event
was predictable before it occurred, even though for the perceiver it was not.").
23.
See Margulies, Valor's Vices, supra note 19, at 96-97 (describing how
commanders will be unsure how much extra risk to undertake in protecting civilians
and may violate ethical norms and international humanitarian law).
24.
See generally SITARAMAN, supra note 5 (describing the relationship between
counterinsurgency and legal operations).
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II. INFORmAL DISPUTE-RESOLUTION PROCESSES

Informal dispute-resolution procedures like the shura and jirga
serve vital purposes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere in the
region. They are an integral part of the culture. 25 Because of their
unique role, these institutions can assist in transitions from societies
that breed terrorist threats to societies that discourage such threats.
Appreciating the role of such institutions in transitions also requires
understanding their function.
The U.S. Army's Counterinsurgency Manual (the Manual)
revealed an appreciation for the role played by culture and
governance. The Manual directed commanders to consider the vital
realm of culture, which it defined as a "system of shared beliefs,
values, customs, behaviors ... that members of a society use to cope
with their world and with one another." 26 Culture, the Manual noted,
is a kind of "operational code."27 The Manual also took care to note
the importance of "social capital," 28 manifested in "networks of
reciprocity and exchange." 29 Moreover, the Manual reminded
commanders of the importance of promoting "better governance,"
including operation of the local justice system. 30 In the clearest
reference to alternative dispute resolution, the Manual opined that
commanders should encourage "local council[s]."
The people and processes entailed in local dispute resolution
merit further inquiry. The jirga is a "group of impartial men in the
community known for their wisdom and ability to make decisions."32
Rather than resort to adversarial practices, such as crossexamination, that typify Western courts, the jirga aims for restorative
justice. In this forum, the decision makers employ inquisitorial
procedures, investigating a case through direct dealings with the
parties-a model much closer to arbitration or mediation. 33

25.
See Jones-Pauly & Nojumi, supra note 2, at 836 (describing the jirga as the
core of the unofficial legal system).
26.
See COIN 1VANUAL, supra note 13, § 3-37.
27.
Id. § 3-38.
28.
See id. § 3-61 (noting that counterinsurgents may identify those with social
capital and how they attract followers).
Id.
29.
30.
See id. § 5-44 (listing justice and public administration as activities related
to good governance).
See id. at tbl.5-5 (describing creation and participation in a local council by
31.
community leaders as part of better governance).
32.
See Kara Jensen, Note, Obstacles to Accessing the State Justice System in
Rural Afghanistan, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 929, 934 (2011); cf. Jones-Pauly &
Nojumi, supra note 2, at 836 ("[Mlembers of the local jirga need not have professional
qualifications. They require instead a local reputation of respect, ability, and
honesty....").
33.
See SITARAMAN, supra note 5, at 193, 203-04 (describing how jirgas settle
disputes through arbitration and mediation rather than through adjudication).
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Restorative justice aims to avoid creating "winners and losers."34 For
the many rural villages where the jirga has long played a role in
governance, disputants must continue to live side by side. Given the
salience of tribal and clan loyalties, rugged terrain, and the dangers
of transportation in regions where bandits and kidnappers thrive,
moving elsewhere is -often impracticable. 3 5 Creating winners and
losers would be dysfunctional, fomenting increased bitterness that
would extend disputes instead of resolving them. 36
Jirgas and other traditional dispute mechanisms have been a
convenient fallback strategy when central government power proved
wanting. In societies where the central government could assert
comprehensive power, state law-enforcement authority could keep the
peace despite grumbling among private parties. However, even before
the Russian invasion of 1979, the Afghan central government had
proven to be corrupt and ineffectual in extending its authority to
rural areas.3 7 Devastating backlogs paralyzed state courts. 3 8 The
central government turned to tribunals consisting of village elders to
ease the backlogs. 3 In this more informal setting, expeditious
settlement of disputes was possible. This was an important selling
point of the informal systems. Disputes needed to be settled quickly,
making the slow pace of formal mechanisms inappropriate. Often,
disputes involved issues fundamental to subsistence, including land
or livestock. 40 No professional class, such as lawyers, existed in rural
areas to manage disputes while the populace went about its
business. 41 Without the speed of informal processes, life would
become unsustainable. 42
Importantly for the current status of jirgas in NIACs, warlords
or local commanders may also assume roles in jirgas. 43 Such
34.
See id. at 193 (highlighting that the goals of these councils are primarily
peacemaking and reconciliation).
35.
See id. at 204 (observing that both sides in rural Afghanistan must view a
resolution as meeting their needs, since the "commitment to honor commands that a
family take revenge for a violation, even if retribution involves a blood feud or could
take generations to fulfill").
36.
Id.
See Jones-Pauly & Nojumi, supra note 2, at 833 (describing the failures of
37.
the establishment of Primary Courts at the rural district level).
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
See id. at 838 (explaining how jirgas settle land disputes in a nontribal
40.
setting).
See id. at 833, 836 (highlighting the lack of qualified personnel for the
41.
Primary Courts in rural districts).
See SITARAMAN, supra note 5, at 204 (noting that the Soviet Invasion and
42.
decades of warfare eradicated many state government institutions, leaving many
Afghans to rely on shuras or jirgas to settle "pressing land and water issues").
43.
See Jones-Pauly & Nojumi, supranote 2, at 836 ("Depending on the scope of
the dispute and its relevance to the well-being of the community, important leaders,
including (in recent times) warlords or local commanders, participate in the

Jirga. . . .").
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individuals are a power base in the community, and including them
bolsters a jirga's legitimacy. Excluding them would make the jirgas
less effective, pushing the population back to the rituals of revenge
and blood feud that cause needless suffering. Moreover, warlords and
commanders with interests in the community will sometimes be
parties to a dispute. Suppose a member of a warlord's militia steals
livestock from a local farmer. The warlord's participation will be
essential to resolution of the controversy. Because warlords and
commanders are part of the community, they are necessarily a part of
informal dispute resolution.
The village shura is a variant of the jirga with comparable
historic roots. 44 Often shuras brought together elders, warlords, or
commanders from a range of villages or tribes.4 5 After Afghanistan's
conflict with Russia, state institutions lost the limited power they had
enjoyed prior to the invasion, while the influence of local warlords
and Islamic clergy who had taken a lead role in fighting the Russians
grew. 46 Afghans regarded the shuras as both more legitimate and
more efficient, since the parties lived alongside the decision makers
and since institutions like shuras were more accessible than
geographically remote state processes. 47 In Afghanistan, the Taliban
has exploited the weakness of state institutions, advancing their own
informal tribunals as a more efficacious and fair option. 48
This extensive pedigree and accessibility to the population make
jirgas and shuras useful instruments of transitional justice. 49
44.
See Jarat Chopra & Tanja Hohe, ParticipatoryIntervention, 10 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 289, 293-94 (2004) (describing a shura as an "indigenous means of local
decisionmaking ... composed

of elders,

religious

authorities, or other ...

well-

respected community members ... [with] good negotiation skills").
45.
Id.; see also BARNETT R. RUBIN, AFGHANISTAN FROM THE COLD WAR
THROUGH THE WAR ON TERROR 118 (2013) (discussing the "national commanders'
shura" held in 1990 at the end of the period of Russian intervention in Afghanistan).
Sometimes the terms shura and jirga have been mixed; for example, after the Taliban
were deposed, the new government, with the support of the United States, convened a
loya jirga or grand assembly to reach consensus on the country's future governance.
See id. at 128 (discussing the proceedings of the loya jirga); cf. Carol J. Riphenburg,
Ethnicity and Civil Society in Contemporary Afghanistan, 59(1) MIDDLE E. J. 31, 39
(2005) (discussing the 2002 "Emergency Loya Jirga").
46.
See SITARAMAN, supra note 5, at 204 ("Due to decades of continuous
war . . . state institutions grew weaker, even nonexistent .

. .

. At the same time,

however, local military commanders displaced the power of landowners and tribal
elders and the Islamic clergy (ulema) likewise grew in influence.").
47.
See id. at 203 (noting that "[45] percent of rural Afghans prefer shuras or
jirgas").
48.
See Barnett R. Rubin, Saving Afghanistan, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 57, 60 (Jan.Feb. 2007) ("[L]ocals are increasingly turning to Taliban-run courts, which are seen as
more effective and fair than the corrupt official system.").
49.
Cf. Stephen D. Krasner, Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for
Collapsed and FailingStates, 29 INT'L SECURITY 85, 103-05 (Fall 2004) (discussing the
perils and promises that come alongside transitional administrations). The precise
dynamics of transitional justice are subject to continued debate. For example,
transitional justice in Iraq has sparked controversy. Compare MICHAEL NEWTON &
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Transitions rely on three crucial factors: institutional repertoire,
inclusion, and redress.5 0 An institutional repertoire frowns on rigid
adherence to one mode of institution as heralding democracy. Rather,
the repertoire must be flexible, building on indigenous and local
traditions. 51 A rigid focus on alien institutions may be
counterproductive, given the lag time involved in importing those
institutions and standing them up in a functional way. Transitions
must also be inclusive; if one faction feels that it lacks a stake in a
successful transition, then it will have no incentive to cooperate in
transition efforts. Reliance on jirgas and shuras can build on local,
indigenous institutions and avoid those obstacles. Because jirgas and
shuras have such an extensive pedigree, they are more trusted than
foreign institutions.5 2
Such local institutions can be a positive force even when one side
in the conflict seeks to co-opt them. In Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Syria, for example, violent non-state actors have used such
alternative dispute mechanisms to consolidate their hold on power
and brand themselves as providing good governance. It seems likely
that judges from the Taliban, for example, view the decisions they
make in a judicial role as also serving the Taliban's broader political
ambitions. However, this mixed intent or self-interested agenda does
not wholly compromise the virtues of such institutions. Gatherings
where the people offer arguments can be liberating in ways that a
particular authority cannot predict or control. 53 Procedures for
MICHAEL SCHARF, ENEMY OF THE STATE: THE TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF SADDAM
HUSSEIN 220-27 (2008) (offering praise for Iraq's effort to hold its former dictator

responsible for mass killings and other abuses), with Danielle Tarin, Note, Prosecuting
Saddam and Bungling Transitional Justice in Iraq, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 467, 491-98
(2005) (noting concerns about the impartiality of the tribunal and the "undue
influence" of certain factions over the appointment of the tribunal's members). A full
assessment of that debate is beyond the scope of this Article.
50.
See generally Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, What Democracy Is
and Is Not, in TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES FROM
SOUTHERN EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA AND EASTERN EUROPE 3, 8-13 (Geoffrey Pridham
ed., 1995) (discussing "procedures" and "principles" that are important for a wellfunctioning democracy). I have discussed transitions in earlier work. See Peter

Margulies, Making "Regime Change"Multilateral: The War on Terror and Transitions
to Democracy, 32 U. DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 389, 419-20 (2004) (proposing a

"multilateral approach" to implementing democratic transitions based on "institutional
repertoire, inclusion, and redress"); cf. Peter Margulies, Democratic Transitions and
the Future of Asylum Law, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 3, 3-7 (1999) (proposing that the
"changed country conditions" analysis in asylum adjudications might benefit from
using the key elements identified in transitions scholarship, i.e., "institutional
repertoire, inclusion, and redress").
51.
See SITARAMAN, supra note 5, at 14-15 (discussing the concept of "organic"

transitions).
52.
See id. at 193 ("The shura and jirga are seen as accessible, fair, and
trusted, less corrupt than state courts, linked with local values [and] effective . . . .").
53.
See Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 12, at 126-29 (arguing that
procedures can have meaning even if their observance in a particular tribunal is not
perfectly uniform).
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arguing the merits, even in a more informal way, can ripen into
democratic habits. Those habits can eventually result in rebellion
against those who seek to bend the tribunals to private agendas.
The importance of traditional dispute resolution is heightened
when the prime counterinsurgency player is a third-party state. 54 A
third-party state assists another state-a "host" state-with a NIAC
on the host-state's territory or uses force on the host-state's territory
against a non-state actor that the host state is either unable or
unwilling to control.5 5 Occasions for mistrust multiply when thirdparty states become involved. In many situations, the third-party
state will have cultural perspectives that are markedly different from
those of the insurgents. In most NIACs involving terrorist groups, for
example, third-party states have been Western, while non-state
actors on the other side have been Middle Eastern or South Asian.5 6
This lineup of opposing forces presents ample opportunities for
cultural misunderstandings.
Foreign elites that seek to impose justice from outside often
trigger suspicion. Those elites often have ideas that do not take into
account the preferences of the people.5 7 Indeed, foreign elites may be
overly invested in distrusted factions, such as the Tajiks that
supported the Karzai regime in Afghanistan and elicited resistance
among the more populous Pashtuns. 58 Unfortunately, officials
supervising third-party state interventions often fail to realize that
transitions can occur most readily through the use of indigenous
institutions and can flounder if indigenous institutions are ignored or
undermined.

54.
See SITARAMAN, supra note 5, at 18 (discussing the unique problems that
confront a nondomestic counterinsurgent).
55.
See Ashley S. Deeks, "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a Normative
Framework for ExtraterritorialSelf-Defense, 52 VA. J. INTL L. 483, 499-503 (2012)
(exploring the "unwilling or unable" test based on the law of neutrality); cf. Karl S.
Chang, Enemy Status and Military Detention in the War Against Al-Qaeda, 47 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 1, 25-36 (2011) (consulting neutrality law to define an "enemy" who can be
targeted or detained); Rebecca Ingber, Untangling Belligerency from Neutrality in the
Conflict with Al-Qaeda, 47 TEX. INT'L L.J. 75, 97-103 (2011) (cautioning that neutrality
law does not provide a useful guide for the detention of non-state actors in NIACs).
56.
Cf. RUBIN, supra note 45, at 150 (highlighting the fact that "Afghanistan
had been through twenty-three years of many-sided civil strife marked by overt and
covert involvement of regional and global powers").
57.
See Leonard Wantchekon, The Paradox of 'Warlord" Democracy: A
Theoretical Investigation, 98 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 17, 28-30 (Feb. 2004) (discussing the
roles of "elites" in French-colonial Africa and Latin America).
58.
See RUBIN, supra note 45, at 150 (discussing the role of ethnic Tajiks,
Uzbeks, and Hazaras in the Northern Alliance, which the United States used after
September 11 to topple the Taliban, whose support came from Kandahar and other
areas in the Pashtun-dominated south).
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IN TARGETING: DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS A
CASUALTY OF WAR

The importance of the jirga and shura, and of informal dispute
resolution generally, has not always been accounted for by targeting
decisions. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the counterinsurgency (COIN)
approach developed by General David Petraeus and embodied in the
Manual moved the U.S. military toward the position outlined in the
previous section.5 9 That move accounted for much of the success of
the United States in Iraq from 2006 through 2011, after the poor
decisions that had plagued earlier U.S. efforts. 60 Success in recent
years in Afghanistan has been more elusive, but where it has
occurred, much credit goes to the same COIN strategy. That said, the
history of targeting in Afghanistan and Pakistan from September 11
to the present is checkered, with at least some incidents occurring
after COIN's ascendancy that have struck a discordant note.
A major part of the problem in the immediate aftermath of
September 11 was the U.S. decision to opt for a quick victory against
the Taliban by supporting the Northern Alliance, a group of warlords
who were not members of the Afghan Pashtun majority. Some of
these commanders used U.S. support as a cover for drug trafficking,
"land grabs[,] . . . political intimidation, and ethnic cleansing."

61

Perhaps because the United States perceived these commanders as
the only militarily powerful rivals to the Taliban, U.S. officials during
this period tolerated the commanders' assertion of dominance over
areas from which they were supposed to withdraw after the arrival of
international security forces. 62
Some targeting decisions relied on faulty information from
informants with private agendas. For example, the scholar Anand
Gopal writes about a tribal elder, Hajji Burget Khan of Kandahar, who
was killed during a U.S. raid in 2002.63 Gopal attributes the raid,
which also caused injuries to the elder's son that left him a paraplegic,

59.
Manual).
60.

See Jenks, supra note 17, at 113-14 (discussing strategies contained in the
See generally FRED KAPLAN, THE INSURGENTS: DAVID PETRAEUS AND THE

PLOT TO CHANGE THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR (2013).
61.
RUBIN, supra note 45, at 229. This cynical view does not reflect a broader
anti-U.S. bias; Rubin served for years as an adviser to U.S. administrations of both
parties. See Bruce Jones, Foreword to BARNETT R. RUBIN, AFGHANISTAN FROM THE
COLD WAR THROUGH THE WAR ON TERROR, at ix-x (2013) (detailing Rubin's affiliations
throughout his work on the subject).
62.
See RUBIN, supra note 45, at 229 (noting how the United States "declined to
press [militia allies]" to leave areas occupied by ISAF despite originally agreeing to
such withdrawals).
63.
Anand Gopal, The Taliban in Kandahar, in TALIBANISTAN: NEGOTIATING
THE BORDERS BETWEEN TERROR, POLITICS, AND RELIGION 1, 26. (Peter Bergen &
Katherine Tiedemann eds., 2013).
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to Afghan allies of -the United States who saw Khan as a "rival."64
Khan's killing radicalized a substantial portion of his tribe, which
viewed the United States as acting on behalf of Khan's foes in
internecine squabbles. 65 Experts have described how the United
States, acting on bad information, "actively helped" their warlord allies
kill the warlords' adversaries. 66 Many of those targeted had already
voiced their wish to seek temporary, provisional arrangements with the
Karzai regime. 67 One former Taliban commander in this group was
Hajji Pay Mohammad who was killed by local authorities after he had
agreed to end his role in hostilities. 68 Targeting based on these tangled
agendas was pervasive in some provinces in which commanders allied
with the United States attacked respected elders with no connection to
the Taliban. 69 Another former Taliban commander who refused to
relinquish his vehicle to the commander supported by the United
States was severely beaten by that commander's minions. 70
Evidence of faulty targeting by both the United States and its
allies on the ground derives not merely from lethal attacks but also
from the pattern of arrests and detentions of suspected terrorists. In
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 7 1 the Supreme Court noted the possibility of
false positives in post-September 11 detention decisions.7 2 While a
substantial number of detainees were actively involved in terrorism,73

64.
See id. at 27 (believing the most likely explanation to be that "the
commanders with whom U.S. forces had allied had seen Khan as a rival"); cf. Anatol
Lieven, Afghanistan: The Way to Peace, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 4, 2013, at 24, 26
(supporting Gopal's analysis).
See Gopal, supra note 63, at 26-27 ("The killing of [Khan] is often cited as
65.
the single most important destabilizing factor in Maiwand district . . . . Three Taliban
commanders from the region interviewed for this report all mentioned the killings as
one of the main factors that led them to join the insurgency.").
See Lieven, supra note 64, at 26 (tying the resurgence of the Taliban in
66.
southern and eastern Afghanistan to the United States' practice of "restor[ing] []
warlords to local power and . . . in many cases actively help[ing] them to eliminate local
rivals").
67.
See id. (discussing the persecution and assassination of Taliban figures who
expressed their desire to reconcile with the Karzai administration).
68.
Martine van Bijlert, The Taliban in Zabul and Uruzgan, in TALIBANISTAN:
NEGOTIATING THE BORDERS BETWEEN TERROR, POLITICS, AND RELIGION 94, 105 (Peter
Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann eds., 2013).
See id. at 106 ("This was a pattern ... repeated in varying degrees all over
69.
the country, where those newly back in power [after the Taliban's fall] reverted to their
pre-Taliban days of asserting dominance, exacting revenge, and marginalizing rivals.").
70.

Id.

71.
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
See id. at 530 (agreeing with the contentions of amici that "the risk of
72.
erroneous deprivation of ... liberty ... is very real" and "[tihe nature of humanitarian
relief work and journalism present a significant risk of mistaken military detentions").
73.
See, e.g., Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying
the "functional standard" and finding that "more likely than not [the defendant] was
part of al Qaeda," the court overturned the lower court's grant of habeas corpus); see
also BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE
OF TERROR 72-102 (2008) (discussing the origins of the detainee population in
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a significant portion in the years immediately following September 11
were tribal elders or others with no evident connection to Al Qaeda or
the Taliban. 74 For example, one former Taliban commander, Mullah
Rahmatullah Sangaryar, was delivered to U.S. forces even though he
had previously made peace with the Afghan government.7 5 Many
believed that Sangaryar's delivery to the United States, which
detained him at Guantanamo until 2007, was driven by the local
U.S.-supported commander's anger that Sangaryar had surrendered
to a fellow tribe member, not to the commander himself.7 6 With such
a message sent about the consequences of surrender, it should not be
surprising that some-but not all-of those abused rejoined the
Taliban insurgency."
Problems with targeting persisted beyond the immediate
aftermath of September 11. One report on drone strikes prepared by
clinics at major U.S. law schools78 cited "convincing evidence" that a
March 17, 2011 strike in Datta Khel in Pakistan's Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) targeted an outdoor bus depot
where tribal leaders had convened a jirga.79 While one may dispute

Guantanamo); cf. Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through
the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 770 n.6 (2011) (discussing the number of people
detained in Iraq and Afghanistan); Matthew C. Waxman, Administrative Detention of
Terrorists: Why Detain, and Detain Whom? 3 J. OF NAT'L SECURITY L. POL'Y 1, 17-23
(2009) (discussing approaches to administrative detention); John B. Bellinger III &
Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in Contemporary Conflicts: Four
Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law, 105 AM. J. INT'L L.
201, 218 (2011) (analyzing the legal ambiguities surrounding detention in NIACs).
74.
See PETER MARGULIES, LAW'S DETOUR: JUSTICE DISPLACED IN THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 34-35 (2010) ("Particularly in the first four years of Guantanamo, the
government detained hundreds of people whose connections to terrorism were
attenuated or nonexistent.").
75.
See van Bijlert, supra note 68, at 106 ("Other examples of former Taliban
being targeted despite having laid down their weapons included .. . the detention and
handover to U.S. forces of Mullah Rahmatullah Sangaryar (reportedly out of spite that
he surrendered his weapons to tribesman Gul Agha Sherzai and not to Jan
Mohammad).").
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
See INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS & CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC, STANFORD LAw
SCH. & GLOBAL JUSTICE CLINIC, N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW, LIVING UNDER DRONES: DEATH,
INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM US DRONE PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN 57-60 (2012)
[hereinafter LIVING UNDER DRONES], available at http://www.livingunderdrones.org/
download-report/ (discussing the events surrounding the March 17, 2011, U.S. drone
strike in Pakistan); see also Zucchino, supra note 3 (reporting on LIVING UNDER
DRONES).
79.
LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 78, at 37. The Columbia Law School
Human Rights Clinic has mentioned this incident in a report based on extensive fact
gathering, including interviews with U.S. personnel. See COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUMAN
RIGHTS CLINIC & CTR. FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT, THE CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES:
UNEXAMINED
COSTS,
UNANSWERED
QUESTIONS
34
(2012),
available at
web.law.columbia.edulhuman-rights-institute/counterterrorism/drone-strikes/civilianimpact-drone-strikes-unexamined-costs-unanswered-questions. See generally Lesley
Wexler, International Humanitarian Law Transparency, (2013) available at

1056

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[vOL. 46:1041

the law school study's negative perspective on drone strikes
generally,8 0 the authors marshal a convincing array of sources to
corroborate their account of this particular attack.8 '
The Manual, while attentive to cultural issues, did not deal
adequately with concerns about damage to informal dispute
resolution. The Manual did not specifically address the interaction of
targeting and alternative dispute resolution. It was also confusing in
its description of targeting. LOAC scholars write about targeting as a
term of art connoting the use of lethal force. 82 However, the Manual
muddied this time-honored formulation. Instead, it referred
generically to targeting as a focus on particular tasks which might
involve force or other tactics. Reflecting this generic use of the term,
the Manual distinguished between "lethal" and "nonlethal"

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2321703
(discussing the role of
international law and civil society in encouraging transparency regarding casualties of
air strikes); Lisa Grow Sun & RonNell Andersen Jones, DisaggregatingDisasters, 60
UCLA L. REV. 884, 904 (2013) (acknowledging the risks of transparency such as undue
disclosure of intelligence sources and methods).
80.
The authors of the Stanford-NYU report did not themselves venture into
FATA, and it is impossible to ascertain whether the incidents described were
representative of drone strikes, generally, or whether some descriptions of particular
incidents were wholly accurate or instead relied on distorted or selective accounts.
81.
See LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 78, at 57-62 (noting evidence from
eyewitnesses, relatives of victims, and journalists, as well as contrasting statements
from unnamed U.S. sources).
82.
The literature on targeting is vast, permitting citation of only a small
sampling of views. Compare Kenneth Anderson, Efficiency In Bello and Ad Bellum:
Making the Use of Force Too Easy?, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN
ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 374, 391-96 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew

Altman eds., 2012) (rejecting the argument that the sophisticated technology behind
drones that makes targeted killing easier also undermines practical checks on the
willingness to wage war), and Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar AlAwlaki as a Case Study in the InternationalLegal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 Y.B.
INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 45-47 (2011) (suggesting that targeted killing under certain
conditions is consistent with LOAC), and Jens David Ohlin, TargetingCo-Belligerents,
in TARGETED KILLINGS, supra, at 60, 75 (analyzing competing schools of thought on
targeting), and Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and
Permissibilityof U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT'LL. & POL'Y 237, 27076 (2010) (asserting that targeted killing is legal under international law as long as the
targeting force observes the principles of distinction and proportionality), with Philip
Alston, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study
on Targeted Killings, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (arguing that
targeted killing in a state that is not a site of narrowly defined armed conflict violates
international law), and Craig Martin, Going Medieval: Targeted Killing, Self-Defense
and the Jus Ad Bellum Regime, in TARGETED KILLINGS, supra, at 223, 245-46 (same),
and Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of
Pakistan, 2004-2009, (Notre Dame L. Sch., Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 09-43),
available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1501144 (same); cf. Jennifer C. Daskal, The
Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the
"Hot" Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1165 (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2049532
(suggesting additional guidelines to regulate
targeted killings).
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targeting.8 3 For commanders used to the standard LOAC usage, this
broader usage could have been confounding.8 4
The Manual's failures in terminology were matched by its gaps
in substantive coverage. According to the Manual, "non-lethal
targets [include] community leaders and those insurgents who
should be engaged through outreach, negotiation, meetings, and
other interaction."8 5 However, the Manual did not expressly urge
commanders to refrain from targeting local alternative-disputeresolution bodies. It also included a rudimentary discussion of the
LOAC principles of distinction and proportionality. 86 Although this
discussion was entirely accurate, it said nothing about using care to
avoid
targeting
indigenous
dispute-resolution
processes.
Furthermore, the Manual did not discuss how to treat situations
where an adversary's combatants play a role in such alternativedispute-resolution efforts. Hence, a more specific analysis is in
order.87

83.
See COIN MANUAL, supra note 12, at ch. 5, § 103 (addressing the best
options for lethal and nonlethal targets).
84.
I may overestimate the degree of confusion caused by the Manual's
"targeting" terminology. One could also view the term targeting as a useful signal to
field commanders of the importance of social, cultural, legal, and political processes. I
am indebted to Chris Jenks for this observation.
85.
See COIN MANUAL, supra note 13, at tbls.5-8.
86.
Id. at ch. 7, §§ 30-37.
87.
President Obama's speech on national security on May 23, 2013, may also
indicate a shift in targeting tactics. In conjunction with the speech, the White House
released an unclassified summary of new guidance intended to minimize civilian
casualties, entitled, U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in
CounterterrorismOperations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities.
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures
for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and
Areas of Active Hostilities (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/
2013/05/white-house-fact-sheet-on-use-of-force-away-from-hot-battlefields/. The exact
geographic parameters of the guidance are not wholly clear, although current U.S.
operations in Afghanistan are clearly excluded. The guidance allows targeting only to
"prevent or stop attacks against U.S. persons." Id. The guidance also requires "[n]ear
certainty that non-combatants . . . will not be injured or killed." Id. In addition,
targeters must reasonably believe that capture is not feasible, the host government of
the target "cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons," and no
"reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the threat." Id. For a thoughtful
response to the President's speech and accompanying policy guidance, see Robert
Chesney, Does the Armed-Conflict Model Matter in PracticeAnymore?, LAWFARE (May
24, 2013, 7:06 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/05/does-the-armed-conflictmodel-matter-in-practice-anymore/. President Obama's speech and guidance consider
policy and tactics, but do not purport to address the underlying legal issues discussed
in this Article.
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IV. STEWARDSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IMPLIED SAFE
CONDUCT FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION

To address this gap between policy and results, this Article turns
to a stewardship conception of the relationship between LOAC and
international human rights. On this view, a third-party state in a
NIAC has a duty of stewardship to the people of the host state.
Stewardship, which admittedly is a lex ferenda concept, emerges from
a current phenomenon in international law: the clash between LOAC
and international human rights law. While champions of the
preemptive model view LOAC as lex specialis, and hence supreme,88
and champions of the protective approach defer to human rights
norms, stewardship views both the preemptive and protective
approaches as too stark. A more granular adjustment of LOAC and
human rights will often be necessary-one that incorporates elements
of both bodies of law without ceding the field to either. 89 The
venerable principle of complementarity, which historically has
governed the relationship of international and municipal law,
provides a model for this reconciliation project. 90 The evolution of
stewardship entails the preservation of popular traditions and
processes.
A. HarmonizingObligations Under InternationalLaw
A general stewardship obligation is hardly unknown to
international law. Consider the law of occupation, which some have
referred to as imposing a duty of temporary trusteeship on the
occupying power.9 1 Trusteeship calls to mind the same impulse as

88.
See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226,
25 (July 8) ('The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of
life ... falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable
in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities."); Schmitt,
Investigating Violations of International Law in Armed Conflict, supra note 15, at 5354 (noting that the principle of lex specialis prevails over the principle of lex generalis
when in conflict).
In other recent work, I have carved out a space for stewardship in a related
89.
sense: as a right that federal officials have under American law to act interstitially
without express congressional authorization when action is necessary to comply with
international law and protect either American citizens or "intending Americans." See
Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law, supra note 6; cf. Robert Knowles,
American Hegemony and the ForeignAffairs Constitution,41 ARIz. ST. L.J. 87, 106-11,
142-45 (2009) (arguing that U.S. courts in post-September 11 cases have shown
limited deference to the executive branch).
90.
See Michael A. Newton, A Synthesis of Community Based Justice and
Complementarity, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND 'LOCAL OWNERSHIP':
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF JUSTICE INTERVENTIONS (Carsten Stahn ed., forthcoming

2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2081904 ('"[J]ustice' is most legitimate
and .. . effective when it is most responsive to the demands of the local population.").
91.
Roberts, supra note 8, at 585; cf. Marco Sassoli, Transnational Armed
Groups and InternationalHumanitarianLaw, HARV. PROGRAM ON CONFLICT RESOL.,
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stewardship: the commitment to preserving norms and institutions.9 2
Under the trusteeship created by occupation, an occupying country
must preserve the "laws" of the occupied nation.9 3 Informal dispute
mechanisms could be considered provisions of procedural law. Thirdparty states may not be occupiers in the legal sense. 9 The
importance of trusteeship in occupation law demonstrates, however,
that international law has long imposed duties on armed forces that
are comparable to the duties suggested here.
Stewardship regarding informal dispute resolution emerges out
of tension between LOAC and human rights. Many scholars have
noted the fragmentation of international law into conflicting
principles and doctrine.95 International law frequently requires the
careful calibration of two conflicting rules or bodies of law. For
example, recent decisions by the European tribunals assumed that
human rights principles incorporated the interpretation of both
United Nations Security Council resolutions 96 and LOAC. 9 The
Winter 2006, at 23-25, available at http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm?
fuseaction=document.showDocumentBylD&nodelD=1&DocumentlD=120
(discussing
the relationship between the law of occupation and the law governing conflict with
transnational armed groups such as Al Qaeda).
92.
See David J. Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 842, 85456 (2003) (giving examples of expected trustee actions under occupation law).
93.
Id. This obligation may not require preserving laws that, as in Nazi
Germany, violate fundamental human rights. However, it does apply in most other
situations. See also EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 12-14
(2d ed. 1993) (discussing the occupying power's duty to preserve the existing laws
governing the occupied territory).
94.
The targeting decisions discussed in this Article will often take place
during an armed conflict, before the third-party state can assert the control that is
necessary to trigger the law of occupation. Moreover, in some situations a third-party
state will operate with the consent of the host state, making the law of occupation
inapplicable.
95.
See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug.
11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (finalized by Martti Koskeniemmi) (reporting on the
difficulties of fragmented international law); Harlan Grant Cohen, Our Fragmenting
Legal Community, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1049, 1064-65 (2012) (suggesting the
plausibility of "find[ing] different [international] communities with different
internalized rules").
96.
See Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1092 (reading the
Security Council as authorizing the United Kingdom to participate in the multinational
force occupying Iraq after Saddam Hussein and as barring indefinite administrative
detention of suspected terrorists, since the European Convention on Human Rights
enumerated types of detention permitted and did not include the detention engaged in
by the member state in Iraq); see also Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi &
Al Barakaat v. Council, 2008 E.C.R. 1-6411 (holding that European regulations
implementing Security Council resolutions on the freezing of alleged sources of
terrorist financing required procedural safeguards such as notice of the specific charges
and an opportunity to review adverse evidence); cf. Harlan Grant Cohen, From
Fragmentationto Constitutionalization,25 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J.
381, 393 (2012) (asserting that the Kadi decision viewed due process as a "potential jus
cogens norm ... concerning United Nations Security Council sanctions against
individuals"); Sudha Setty, What's in a Name? How Nations Define Terrorism Ten
Years After 9/11, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 56-57 (2011) (discussing the procedural
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tribunals in each case narrowly interpreted the source of authority
that appeared to clash with human rights law. 98
Although the European courts that have sought to reconcile
different sources of international law may have gotten the balance
wrong, the overall project of harmonizing principles is sound. A
preemptive approach that elbowed out any non-LOAC sources of law
would, on the surface, have the virtue of lending clarity to the
decisions of battlefield commanders. It would also preserve flexibility
since commanders would always have the option of adopting more
restrictive ROE. If prudential considerations dictate more restrictive
ROE, the champions of the preemptive view would say, that option is
always available. However, the preemptive model's champions would
maintain, reading those restrictions into law confuses policy with
binding norms.
The preemptive model's champions forget that prudential
concerns are among the central pillars of both LOAC specifically and
international law more generally. Consider the prohibition on perfidy,
which is based in part on fears that the failure to discourage
deceptive tenders of surrender would encourage receiving forces to
disregard offers of surrender, even when those offers were made in
good faith.99 Similarly, the bar on abuse of captives derives in part
from the concern that commanders who know their soldiers will be
treated humanely upon capture are less likely to create needless
suffering by fighting on beyond the needs of strategy. 0 0 Consider also
the separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, based in part on
concerns that holding foot soldiers responsible for senior commanders'
decisions to wage aggressive war would unnecessarily prolong
conflicts. 101 Pragmatic concerns of this type are integral to

safeguards adopted by the United Nations regarding the administration of resolutions
combatting terrorism).
97.
Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 41-42 (reading LOAC
rules on investigations of allegedly unlawful killings by state forces during occupation
in tandem with the overarching human right to life).
Id.; Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1092.
98.
99.
See Margulies, The Fog of War Reform, supra note 4, at 1429-30 ("LOAC
prohibit perfidy precisely because it produces doubt . .. about the sincerity of a
defeated force's attempt to surrender, and thereby discourages a victorious force from
honoring that attempt."); cf. Sean Watts, Law-of-War Perfidy 25-26 (Draft, July 29,
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2220380 (explaining the prohibition on
perfidy, in part, on grounds that "enemies had to be assured that honoring law-of-war
rights and duties would not result in tactical or operational disadvantage").
100.
See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 8-9 (2010) (discussing the reluctance to surrender during
the World War II battle for Iwo Jima).
101.
See Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation:Preserving the Dualism of Jus
ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 47,
48-49 (2009) (introducing current perspectives on jus ad bellum and jus in bello
principles of war); cf. Eyal Benvenisti, Rethinking the Divide Between Jus ad Bellum
and Jus in Bello in Warfare Against Nonstate Actors, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 541, 543-44
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determining what counts as a war crime. Adding concern about
informal dispute resolution is, viewed in this light, part of a
continuum rather than a radical departure. Here, too, as has been
discussed, disregard of such processes may needlessly prolong a
conflict or make the conflict more volatile. 102 Considering such
concerns is not alien to LOAC; it is crucial to LOAC's development.
Moreover, prudence has also informed the workings of the
principle of complementarity as a referee for clashes between
domestic law and international criminal law (ICL). The principle of
complementarity is a vital element in the structure of ICL. That
principle holds that a state's own criminal processes are a first resort
and that international tribunals are complementary to national
jurisdiction. Tribunals often invoke complementarity to defer to a
state's decisions about prosecution of its own officials for war
crimes.10 3
Stewardship in this context echoes complementarity under ICL
because stewardship does not merely refer to state obligations under
human rights law. Because stewardship does not require wholesale
restrictions on state targeting rights under LOAC, it recognizes
legitimate state interests in ways that the protective paradigm does
not. As a practical matter, therefore, stewardship also preserves the
third-party state's stake in following human rights law. Stewardship
concedes that the powerful nations that often occupy roles as thirdparty states in NIACs have other options available to them besides
compliance if human rights law becomes unduly restrictive. 104
European states displeased at what is perceived as unduly intrusive
decisions by EU tribunals have explored one option: restricting the
charter and mandate of those tribunals. 05 In the United States, the

(2009) (asserting that the larger role of non-state actors has reduced the value of
separation).
102.
See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
103.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July -17, 1998, pmbl.
1 10, art. 1, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) (noting that the ICC
was established as "complementary to national criminal jurisdictions"); id., art. 17(1),
(2) (classifying a case as inadmissible in the ICC when a state with jurisdiction is
currently engaged in or has engaged in a bona fide investigation or prosecution);
Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Application of the
Government of Kenya Challenging Admissibility, 1 19 (Sept. 20, 2011),
http://www.worldcourts.com/icdeng/decisions/2011.09.20_Prosecutor_vMuthaura2.pdf
(noting that "complementarity is a core guiding principle for the relationship between
States and the Court").
See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, THE FOG OF LAw: PRAGMATISM, SECURITY, AND
104.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (2010) (recommending a "broader and more flexible
interpretive method," in part because an unduly strict approach would give states an
incentive to engage in wholesale disregard of international law).
105.
See Conference Report, Council of Europe, High Level Conference on the
Future of the European Court of Human Rights Brighton Declaration (Apr. 19-20,
2012), http://hub.coe.int/20120419-brighton-declaration (requiring the ECHR to display
greater deference to executive decisions).
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Supreme Court will defer to a clear statement from Congress
expressing an intent to violate international law.10 6 A stewardship
approach that tailors restrictions on states to avoid undue restrictions
on
legitimate-state-targeting
prerogatives
also
preserves
international law by blunting state efforts to neutralize or evade
international norms.
This pragmatic rationale shapes operation of the principle of
complementarity under ICL. As the International Criminal Court
(ICC) has noted, complementarity "strikes a balance" that
harmonizes state interests and international law. 107 Preserving a
measure of discretion for state decisions acknowledges the
importance of sovereignty, which since Westphalia has been a central
building block of international law. Acknowledging sovereignty
promotes a healthy partnership with international institutions.
Abandoning complementarity would endanger that partnership; as
the ICC conceded, "Without [complementarity] . . . there would have

been no agreement" possible among states party to the Rome
Statute.08

Complementarity under ICL also illustrates the important,
albeit controversial, role of indigenous and informal dispute
resolution. One influential court decision has argued that informal
means of dispute resolution, as well as more formal proceedings,
should trigger complementarity.1 09 A South African tribunal held
that truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) and restorative
justice can be an adequate substitute under the South African
Constitution for more formal modes of accountability. 110 The

106.
See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888) ("[I]f the power to
determine these matters is vested in congress, it is wholly immaterial to inquire
whether by the act assailed it has departed from the treaty or not, or whether such
departure was by accident or design, and, if the latter, whether the reasons were good
or bad."). As one example of legislation clashing with international law, consider that
in Title 50 of the U.S. Code, Congress has implicitly authorized covert action that may
violate the sovereignty of other states. See Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence
Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate, 5 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. &
POL'Y 539, 622-23 (2012) (examining the authorization of covert action under
international law).
107.
Prosecutorv. Muthaura, No. ICC-01/09-02/11 at 1 19.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
108.
109.
See Azanian People's Org. v. The President of the Republic of South Africa
1996 (4) SA 672 (CC) at paras. 24-30 (S. Afr.) (explaining that "lawmakers of the
Constitution should not lightly be presumed to authorize any law which might
constitute a breach of the obligations of the state in terms of international law").
Id; see also Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, Radical Forgiveness: Transforming
110.
Traumatic Memory Beyond Hannah Arendt, in JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-

APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 37, 37 (Francois Du Bois & Antje Du Bois-Pedain eds., 2008)
(arguing that forgiveness for heinous acts is possible after a public process); Leila

Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty, and International Law, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955,
984-94 (2006) (discussing TRCs and amnesties, while critiquing failures to prosecute
perpetrators of human rights abuses); id. at 1028 (certain amnesties may serve
interests of justice and may receive a margin of "appreciation" or deference under
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restorative model stressed collective deliberation, achievement of
insight, and apology in face-to-face exchanges between victim and
perpetrator. As the South African court explained, local processes
such as public acknowledgments of guilt and face-to-face apologies to
victims can enhance the net stake of all constituencies in reform
efforts, thus easing the transition from tyranny.111
Scholars have also praised this informal turn, asserting that
intrusion by international bodies can frustrate reform by discrediting
local efforts. 112 International bodies can proceed hastily and
heedlessly, eroding indigenous change." 3 Ultimately, change emerges
from indigenous institutions informed by international guidance.
Informal local efforts, including TRCs, should be viewed as within a
state's options under the ICL complementarity regime.
Just as ICL should defer to national investigation and
prosecution of war crimes, the law of war in third-party NIACs
should defer to processes built into national law through custom and
acquiescence. Preservation of those processes, including popular
means of dispute resolution, should trump the discretion that a thirdparty state would otherwise enjoy under conventional LOAC
principles. A counterinsurgency that ignores or disrespects those
processes will not enjoy the support of the people. It therefore will be
doomed to failure.
This still leaves an unresolved issue: the sovereign rights
recognized by ICL's principle of complementarity may not apply to
NIACs where a host state has consented to third-party state
involvement." 4 However, a host state cannot consent to all actions by

international law). The South African Constitution incorporates many norms of
international human rights law.
17-19 ("[B]ut for a
111.
See Azanian People's Org., 1996 (4) SA 672 (CC) at
mechanism providing for amnesty, the 'historic bridge' [from apartheid to equal rights]
might never have been erected.").
See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
112.
148 (2007) (praising restorative-justice mechanisms that promote a "forgiveness
process characterized by truth telling, redefinition of the identity of the belligerents,
justice, and call for a new relationship" (quoting WILLIAM J. LONG & PETER BRECKE,
WAR AND RECONCILIATION: REASON AND EMOTION IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3 (2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted))); Newton, supra note 90, at 13 ("[P]ermitting
external actors to supersede the established set of domestic punishments and cultural
traditions would be a modern form of legal colonialism.").
113.
See DRUMBL, supra note 112, at 70 (recognizing that "local justice
institutions" may employ diverging justice approaches that "more accurately reflect
[the] sociolegal norms of the places most immediately afflicted"); Michael A. Newton,

The Quest for Constructive Complementarity, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 304, 332-33 (Carsten
Stahn & Mohamed M. El Zeidy eds., 2011) (warning of the "presumption of
supranational superiority" in which transnational tribunals like the ICC override
domestic decisions, thereby sending the wrong message about the development of
domestic capabilities).

114.

See Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and International Law

Supremacy, 54 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 34-35 (2013) (discussing the scope of consent).
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a third-party state." 5 International law limits the latter to actions
that would be permissible by the host state. 116 Here, international
law should provide protection for informal indigenous dispute
resolution.
B. CulturalProperty and Self-Determination
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) declares that "[a]ll peoples have the right of selfdetermination."" 7 People exercising that right may "freely pursue
their

economic,

social,

and

cultural ' development." 118

The

development contemplated by this Article includes not merely the
opportunity for political autonomy, which the ICCPR also guarantees,
but the opportunity to preserve and develop customs, traditions, and
institutions that make that right to political autonomy meaningful.
Those processes and institutions are a form of collectively held
property that each generation holds in trust for those to come. As the
Manual noted, such processes are a form of social capital that a
society relies on to both survive and flourish.119
The preservation of such capital is arguably more essential to
self-determination than tangible forms of property. Human rights law
today would view forms of direct expropriation as triggering a duty of
compensation. 120 In situations of armed conflict, it may well be
necessary for forces of one party to take control of property, at least
temporarily, or even to destroy it-for example, when armed forces of
an adversary have taken cover in a civilian dwelling. 121 Land,

See id. (recognizing the limitations on consent in relation to third-party
115.
states).
116.
See id. ("As a result, international law should not permit consent to serve
as a standalone basis for force when the host state's consent exceeds what it could do
under its own laws.").
117.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1(1), Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-20.
118.
Id.
119.
See COIN MANUAL, supra note 13, at ch. 3, § 61 (defining "social capital" as
the power of individuals and groups to use the social networks of reciprocity and
exchange to accomplish their goals, and identifying patron-client relationships as an
important form of social capital in many nonwestern societies).
120.
See Steven R. Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond
the Fear of Fragmented InternationalLaw, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 475, 485-88 (2008)
(identifying human rights as a goal of the regimes that address regulatory takings).
121.
A force taking fire from an adversary concealed in a dwelling will have the
right to destroy the dwelling, if they can do so in compliance with the principles of
distinction, proportionality, and precaution. Forces fired upon can also mount an attack
on forces concealed within the dwelling, and assume temporary control of the dwelling
once they have captured or killed those forces, or caused them to retreat. Conducting
hostilities would be impossible without the right to take such measures in the exigency
of battle.
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however, has cultural meanings that transcend monetary concerns. 122
Processes and institutions have such meanings to an even greater
degree. 123 Moreover, the damage done by undermining such processes
and institutions may be far more difficult to remedy than -damage
done to tangible property.
Dispute-resolution processes can be conceptualized as a form of
collectively held cultural property. Many sources recognize a right to
property. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
bars the arbitrary deprivation of property.124 International law has
also increasingly recognized property's cultural dimension. Article 15
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights holds that all persons have the "right . . . [t]o take part in
cultural life."125 Third-party states do not have a duty to create such
processes.1 26 However, they should preserve processes that already
exist.
Two important human rights decisions have affirmed the
interdependence of property and culture. The African Commission on
Human Rights' Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SER)
decision reinforced the "traditional place" accorded cooperative
economic development.1 27 The SER tribunal held that Nigeria, acting
in concert with the Shell Petroleum Development Corporation, had
violated the African Charter by using intimidation and brutality in

122.
See Moiwana Village v. Suriname, Judgment on the Preliminary
Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, $1 86(6), 101 (June 15, 2005) (finding
that a N'djuka community's connection to its traditional land is of vital spiritual,
cultural, and material importance, and holding that the state of Suriname violated the
community's right to property enshrined in the American Convention on Human
Rights).
123.
Cf. Mark A. Drumbl, Policy Through Complementarity: The Atrocity Trial
As Justice, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY 197, 212

(Carsten Stahn & Mohamed M. El Zeidy eds., 2011) (criticizing the rigid view of ICL as
revealing a lack of "legal imagination" and discouraging "modalities [that] deviate from
the core structure and precepts of ideal-type criminal trials . .. regardless of the public
respect for, possibilities of, or broader socio-transitional status of such modalities").
124.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) art. 17(2), U.N.
Doc. AIRES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
125.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art.
15(1)(a), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
126.
This Article does not endorse the wholesale imposition of affirmative duties
on states in the economic and cultural realms. Judicial framing of such affirmative
obligations can have unintended consequences, including distortion of state priorities.
See LOUIs HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 148-52 (2d ed. 2009); but see Kim Lane
Scheppele, Amartya Sen's Vision for Human Rights - and Why He Needs the Law, 27
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 17, 28-30 (2012) (expressing a greater willingness to consider the
judicial imposition of affirmative duties).
127.
See Social and Economic Rights Action Center v. Nigeria, Comm. 155/96,
15th Ann. Activity Rep't, T 56 (African Comm'n on Hum. & People's Rts. 2001)
(suggesting that "[t]he drafters of the [African] Charter obviously wanted to remind
African governments of the continent's painful legacy and restore co-operative
economic development to its traditional place at the heart of African Society").
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forcing a community to leave its ancestral home to make way for an
oil facility.12 8
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights' decision in
Moiwana Village1 29 is an even more compelling precedent on the
property-culture relation. The Moiwana Village court described the
adverse effect on cultural life of a massacre by state forces that killed
forty members of a community, the N'djuka, and caused survivors of
the massacre to flee the village where they had lived for decades.130
The court noted that the "community's relationship to its traditional
land is of vital spiritual, cultural, and material importance."13 ' Citing
the confluence of property and cultural norms, the court observed
that the displaced community exemplified the "unique and enduring
ties that bind indigenous communities to their ancestral territory." 3 2
It also quoted approvingly from an expert witness who had opined
that the relationship with this particular land is a "fundamental
aspect of . .. [the N'djuka's] identity and sense of well being." 3 3 The
expert observed that "[w]ithout regular commune with these
lands ... [the N'djuka] are unable to practice and enjoy their cultural
and religious traditions." 184 The court found that units of the
Suriname army that had perpetrated the massacre were guilty of a
range of violations of the American Convention on Human Rights.' 3 5
These violations included Article 5-the right to humane treatmentand Article 21-the right to property.13 6
Informal dispute-resolution processes and practices, such as the
jirga and religious courts, comprise a cultural legacy that law should
respect just as strongly as it protects real property. Practices and
rituals of this kind give life to a community, allowing further
economic, social, and cultural development. Conducting hostilities in
a manner that jeopardizes this legacy is a recipe for continued

128.
See id. 1 55 (setting forth the alleged violations of Article 21 of the African
Charter by Nigeria).
129.
See generally Moiwana Village v. Suriname, Judgment on the Preliminary
86(6), 101 (June 15, 2005) (finding
Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124,
that a N'djuka community's connection to its traditional land is of vital spiritual,
cultural, and material importance, and holding that the state of Suriname violated the
community's right to property enshrined in the American Convention on Human
Rights).
130.
See id. 1 86(15)-86(20), 101-03 (discussing the effect of Suriname's 1986
conflict on the N'djuka).
Id. T 86(6).
131.
132.
See id.
131-34 (finding that the Moiwana community members, as
N'djuka tribal people, possess an 'all-encompassing relationship' to their traditional
lands" and therefore may be considered the "legitimate owners of their traditional
lands").
133.
Id. 132.
134. Id.
135.
See id. $1 103, 121, 135, 163-64 (noting the specific violations of the
American Convention on Human Rights).
136.
Id.
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instability. Such tactics therefore violate the stewardship duties of a
third-party state. Cultural arguments may be most compelling in
cases involving ethnic, religious, or other minorities, such as the
Moiwana Village survivors who face the threat of internal
persecution.13 7 However, one can extend this argument to the case of
third-party states in NIACs. All conflicts of this kind, such as those
involving U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and
Somalia, array the third-party state against non-state actors of a
different nationality and often entail differences in ethnicity, culture,
and religion. As the Manual concedes, forces of the third-party state
may not attach the proper importance to cultural differences. The law
can and should step in to bridge the gap.
C. OperationalizingStewardship:Implied Safe Conduct
Recognition of an implied safe conduct for individuals engaged in
informal dispute resolution can ensure that this stewardship
obligation is met. Safe conducts are a venerable aspect of both
international law generally and LOAC specifically. 138 Their
constructive or implied creation has historically been subject to
rigorous limits. The duty of stewardship urged here would broaden
the ambit of implied safe conducts. Understanding that expansion
first requires some understanding of the current place of safe
conducts in protecting dispute resolution and limiting targeting.
Safe conduct grants are among the oldest features of CIL.13 9
They extend to a range of individuals, including plenipotentiaries,1 40
merchants, and others. In his analysis of the rationale for these rules,
Blackstone explained that they were practical in nature, identifying
See Willem van Genugten, Protection of Indigenous Peoples on the African
137.
Continent: Concepts, Position Seeking, and the Interaction of Legal Systems, 104 AM. J.
INT'L L. 29, 41-42, 57-58 (2010) (analyzing whether the 2007 United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples might be instrumental in helping to
solve the human rights problems faced by the indigenous peoples of Africa); Alexandra
Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights in InternationalLaw Over the Last 10 Years and Future
Developments, 10 MELB. J. INT'L L. 27, 30, 33-34 (2009) (discussing trends in the
jurisprudence on indigenous rights); Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities:
The Limits of an AntidiscriminationApproach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 174546 (2012) (analyzing the risks and benefits of an antidiscrimination approach); cf.
Kirsty Gover, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture,
Strategy (Review Essay), 12 MELB. J. INT'L L. 419, 420, 430-31 (2011) (assessing Karen
Engle's similarly titled book that argues that stress on cultural rights has been
counterproductive because it has displaced political arguments based on selfdetermination).
138.
See Lee, supra note 11, at 844-45, 871-72 (finding "violation of safe.
conducts" discussed within William Blackstone's Commentaries).
139.
See id. (highlighting the inclusion of safe conduct grants within
Blackstone's list of "three specific offenses against the law of nations").
140.
See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J.
INT'L L. 705, 733 (1988) (referring to the term plenipotentiary as denoting a type of
special ambassador or state representative).

1068

VANDERBILT]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 46.-1041

values and practices whose "preservation" enabled "intercourse and
commerce between one nation and another."14 1 Blackstone noted that
they come in two varieties, express and implied, neither of which
matches the broader conception offered here.142
Express safe conducts are privileges articulated in documents
issued to a specific individual to pass safely through another state's
territory.143 Such grants are given to an individual whose safety
would otherwise be threatened by such travel, for example, an
accused criminal or an "enemy."144 An implied safe conduct is not the
result of express documentation received by a specific individual. 145
Instead, it can result from positive municipal legislation regarding a
class of persons. 146 At least one prominent scholar has also argued
that a "general" implied safe conduct can also be derived from the law
of nations. 147 According to this analysis, the Magna Carta's extension
of safe conduct to foreign merchants was grounded in "ancient and
rightful customs," which can be read as a medieval allusion to CIL.148
Protection of merchants also served as a pragmatic encouragement of
dispute resolution and a limit on the acrimony caused by armed
conflict.149

Other individuals or instrumentalities that either temper conflict
or provide no military advantage to either party have received safe
conduct through treaty or custom. The Second Geneva Convention
and Additional Protocol I list vessels specifically immune from both
capture and attack.1 50 These include hospital ships, other medical
transports, and small craft used for rescue operations.15 ' The ICRC
commissioned ships to feed allied POWs during World War II, and
the parties to the conflict expressly gave these vessels safe conduct.152

141.
Lee, supra note 11, at 871-72.
142.
Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the
Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 480 (2011).
143.
Id.
144.
See id. at 479 ("A safe conduct privileged a person who otherwise could not
travel safely within a nation's territory.").
145.
See id. at 480 (noting that implied safe conducts do not require
personalized documentation).
146.
Id.
147.
See Lee, supra note 11, at 874-75 (discussing the idea of implied safe
conducts and the law of nations).
Id.
148.
149.
Enlightenment publicists viewed commerce between nations as part of the
douceur or sweetness of life that tempered monarchs' warlike urges. See CHARLESLOUIs DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 389 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds.,
1989) ("[I]n this way commerce was able to avoid violence and maintain itself
everywhere."); ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL
ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 73-74 (1977) (discussing
Montesquieu's views on the relationship between commerce and war).
150.
Doswald-Beck, supranote 16, at 206.
Id.
151.

152.

See Francois Bugnion, The InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross and

the Development of InternationalLaw, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 191, 205 (2004) (recognizing
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The Hague Convention No. XI of 1907 protects vessels charged with
religious, nonmilitary, scientific, or philanthropic missions, as well as
small coastal fishing crafts.1 53 The latter have also been regarded as
protected under CIL.154 Small coastal fishing vessels generally are
viewed as helping indigenous civilians who -engage in fishing for their
subsistence.' 55 Targeting such vessels would endanger civilian lives
and health, while achieving no strategic objective. One could also
view the targeting of such vessels as deepening the acrimony that
characterizes armed conflicts, making such conflicts harder to
resolve.
In addition, LOAC confers safe conduct on a negotiator for one
side, called a parlementaire,who unilaterally seeks to communicate
with the other side under a flag of truce. 156 The parlementaire "has a
right to inviolability" for the duration of his mission.1'5 7 The other
party to the conflict is not necessarily required to enter into
communications. 158 However, the logic of safe conduct that the
parlementaire acquires to extend the offer of communication
presumably continues until the other side has both communicated its
refusal to parlay and given the parlementaire a reasonable
opportunity to retreat to safety.

the use of the red cross emblem to designate vessels with safe conduct). Of course, the
ICRC is not a negotiator-its mission is humanitarian in nature. Nevertheless, as a
practical matter, the service to humanity offered by the ICRC also, in the long run,
reduces acrimony between the parties to an armed conflict and therefore tends, as with
negotiators, to reduce its duration and likelihood of recurrence.
153.
See Doswald-Beck, supra note 16, at 202 (listing vessels specifically exempt
from attack).
154.
See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 707 (1900) ("[C]ustomary law
establishes an exception of immunity in favor of coast fishing vessels."). Some scholars
have expressed skepticism about the creation of CIL norms, which may not entail the
consent of states that would be bound by those norms. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC
A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 45-47 (2005); Jack Goldsmith &
Jeremy Rabkin, A Treaty the Senate Should Sink, WASH. POST, July 2, 2007, at A19
(arguing that ratifying the Convention on the Law of the Sea will impair U.S.sovereign interests).
155.
Cf. Ronald S. McClain, The Coastal FishingVessel Exemption from Capture
and Targeting: An Example and Analysis of the Origin and Evolution of Customary
InternationalLaw, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 77, 81 (1998) (stating that Louis XVI of France in
1779 explained the protection of coastal fishing as emerging from a "desire to soften the
calamities of war").
156.
See Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Annex), art. 32,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910) [hereinafter
Hague Convention IV] (defining parlementaireand providing the right of inviolability).
157.
Id.
158.
See id. at art. 33 ('The commander to whom a parlementaire is sent is not
in all cases obliged to receive him.").
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D. Implied Safe Conduct and Indigenous Dispute Resolution
An implied safe conduct for informal indigenous dispute
resolution would limit targeting. However, it would avoid across-theboard curbs. To grasp the impact of this change, this Article starts
with the two fundamental norms relevant to targeting: the principles
of distinction and proportionality.
The principle of distinction holds that a state may only target
combatants or military objectives.1 59 Permissible targets include not
only uniformed forces but also nominal civilians who directly
participate in hostilities (DPH).160 The principle of proportionality
limits the collateral damage that targeting military objectives may
cause to civilian and nonmilitary assets; such damage must be
proportionate compared with the military objective achieved. 16'
Implied safe conduct would preclude targeting of anyone
involved in indigenous alternative dispute resolution for the duration
of the dispute-resolution process as well as time spent traveling to
and from the physical site of the process. To further explore the
contours of the proposed rule, consider recent guidelines from the
ICRC that define who may be targeted as a DPH.162 According to the

159.
See Additional Protocol I, supra note 18, at art. 48 (noting the obligation to
distinguish between civilians and combatants); STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE VIOLENCE OF
PEACE: AMERICA'S WARS IN THE AGE OF OBAMA 58 (2011) (noting that the principle of

distinction forbids the targeting of noncombatants); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT
OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 8 (2d ed. 2010)

(writing that the ICJ has supported

the distinction between combatants

and

noncombatants); INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE MANUAL ON
THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT § 1.2.2 (Michael N. Schmitt,

Charles H.B. Garraway & Yoram Dinstein, Drafting Committee 2006) [hereinafter
MANUAL] (describing the principle of distinction as the foundation of LOAC).
160.
See id. (seeking to protect citizens not "actively (directly) participating in
armed conflict").
161.
See Additional Protocol I, supra note 18, at art. 51(5)(b) (barring attacks
that cause collateral damage to civilians that is "excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated"); cf. MANUAL, supra note 159, at § 2.1.1.4.1
(explaining that the rule of proportionality is derived from the principle of distinction).
While the United States has declined to ratify Additional Protocol I because of concerns
about other provisions, it considers the provisions dealing with the principles of
distinction and proportionality to be CIL that binds both states and individuals. See
Michael J. Matheson, Remarks, Session One: The United States Position on the
Relation of Customary InternationalLaw to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 415, 420 (1987) (noting that the
United States considers itself legally bound by the Additional Protocol I rules that
reflect CIL); cf. Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World
United Against Terrorism, 45 TEX. INT'L L.J. 323, 344-47 (2009) (discussing the
political agendas that contributed to the enactment of Additional Protocol I).
162.
See NILS MELZER, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE
ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 33-36 (2009) [hereinafter ICRC Guidance], available at
http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/20/Legal%2OConference/ICRC_002_0990.pdf (providing
definitions of armed forces, state armed forces, and organized armedgroups).
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ICRC, some civilians are so deeply and persistently engaged in
hostilities that they assume a continuous combat function (CCF) and
so can be targeted at any time. 163 In contrast, other civilians do not
undertake a CCF and are therefore targetable only for the precise
time that they are participating in hostilities through activities such
as targeting others, deploying for the purpose of targeting, or directly
supporting targeting efforts by, for example, transporting others to a
site where an attack is to occur. 164
The ICRC adopted narrow definitions of both DPHand CCF that
immunized most non-state participants. 16 5 For example, the ICRC
said that a bomb maker for a terrorist group could not be targeted as
he assembled the explosive device since others would have to deploy
it.166 Even if the bomb maker's work met this restrictive test, he
would be protected from targeting once he finished making the bomb,
until he started work on the next one.167
Scholars criticized this test as artificial and as providing
terrorist groups with an unfair advantage.168 According to the critics,
the ICRC's narrow test for CCF created a "revolving door" through
which violent non-state actors, such as bomb makers for terrorist

163.
A CCF is a useful concept, although it has prompted some confusion about
whether targeting of persons in a CCF role is based on such persons' conduct or their
status. See Geoffrey Corn, Two Sides of the Combatant COIN: Untangling Direct
Participation in Hostilities from Belligerent Status in Noninternational Armed
Conflicts, in COUNTERINSURGENCY LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
58, 65-71 (William C. Banks ed., 2013) (arguing that certain non-state actors in a
NIAC can be targeted because of their status as belligerents fighting for a party to the
conflict and that the CCF label may needlessly complicate this targetability).
164.
See ICRC Guidance, supra note 162, at 66 (providing examples of conduct
that may be considered "direct participation in hostilities").
165.
See Margulies, The Fog of War Reform, supranote 4, at 1469 (analyzing the
narrow definition of CCF relative to a restrictive causation requirement).
166.
See ICRC Guidance, supra note 162, at 54 (asserting that the "assembly
and storing of an improvised explosive device (IED) ...

do not cause . . . harm

directly").
167.
See id. (distinguishing direct and indirect participation); cf. Michael N.
Schmitt, DeconstructingDirect Participationin Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements,
42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697, 731 (2010) (criticizing the narrow view of causation in
the ICRC Guidance).
168.
See Eric Talbot Jensen, DirectParticipationin Hostilities:A Concept Broad
Enough for Today's Targeting Decisions, in NEW BATTLEFIELDS, OLD LAWS: CRITICAL
DEBATES

ON ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

85, 94

(William C.

Banks ed.,

2011)

("[A]

restrictive definition of 'direct participation' does not allow sufficient coverage of the
range of activities involved in fighting terrorist organizations."); Schmitt, supra note
167, at 699 (criticizing the ICRC's approach as failing "to fully appreciate the
operational complexity of modern warfare"); Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost:
OrganizedArmed Groups and the ICRC "Direct Participationin Hostilities"Interpretive
Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 641, 643-44 (2010) (criticizing the ICRC's
guidance as exacerbating asymmetries favoring violent non-state actors over states); cf.
NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 142-43

(2010) (discussing the debate).
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groups, could escape targeting.169 Scholars critical of this move have
noted that uniformed state forces, in contrast, are always targetable,
even while they sleep. This created an asymmetry that the ICRC's
critics view as inherently destabilizing, and one which compounded
the advantage already enjoyed by non-state actors who refused to
distinguish themselves as combatants through the wearing of
insignia and the open carrying of arms.
While the ICRC's critics have the better argument regarding the
bomb maker, who is arguably engaged in a CCF,170 there are stronger
arguments that combatants engaged in informal dispute resolution
should not be considered as DPH while engaged in that activity.
Moreover, and perhaps more controversially, under the implied-safe
conduct theory advanced in this Article, even an individual who is
otherwise in a CCF would be immune for the time that the activity
consumes. Suppose a commander for an extremist non-state actor
devotes time to presiding over a religious court. While such a
commander may have a CCF that would justify his being targeted at
any time, an interlude of participation in an informal disputeresolution session should suspend this CCF period.
However, to avoid putting targeters in an impossible position,
participants in dispute resolution should have a reciprocal duty to
distinguish themselves. Dispute-resolution participants should use a
symbol, like the white flag of truce used by parlementaires' 7 ' or the
emblem designated in the Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.172 This marking
will give the attacking force a reasonable opportunity to avoid
targeting participants in dispute resolution. A dispute-resolution
emblem, like other markings in LOAC, is also a confidence-building
measure. The party using the emblem gives up something valuable in
an armed conflict-the location of the person or group claiming
protection. Locational data aids targeting by the other side in the
event that those claiming protection abuse the protection granted in
order to gain a tactical advantage. 73 Providing that locational data

169.
See Watkin, supra note 168, at 643-44 (indicating that individuals who fall
short of the CCF, yet provide support, may gain protection as civilians); Bill Boothby,
"And for such time as": The Time Dimension to Direct Participationin Hostilities, 42
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 741, 753-55 (2010) (explaining the "revolving door of
protection" as a "natural consequence" of treaty provisions that protect civilian status).
170.
See Margulies, The Fog of War Reform, supra note 4 at 1469-70 (arguing
that a bomb maker could use the "revolving door of protection" even if he satisfied the
ICRC's causation definition).
See Hague Convention IV, supra note 156, at art. 32 (indicating that flag
171.
bearers who accompany parlementaires also benefit from inviolability).
172.
See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict with Regulations for Execution of the Convention art. 16, May 14,
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (describing the blue and white emblem of the Convention).
173.
Cf. Michael W. Lewis & Emily Crawford, Drones and Distinction:How IHL
Encouraged the Rise of Drones, GEO. J. INT'L L. text accompanying notes 37-44
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therefore gives the person or group claiming protection a significant
incentive to act in good faith.
Even with the requirement that those claiming protection
distinguish themselves, the approach outlined here may impair
targeting. However, it will also improve good will and ultimately
lessen the time spent in hostilities. That goal is central to LOAC.1 74
Rather than leave the question to the tactical domain of ROE, the law
should affirmatively protect court-based commanders.175
Moreover, implied safe conduct would go beyond a bar on
targeting and would also substantially revise the proportionality
principle's permission for the targeter to cause collateral damage.
Implied safe conduct would treat commanders and their subordinates
in the activities described above as the equivalent of diplomats,
plenipotentiaries, or ICRC personnel and assets-persons that a
third-party state has an affirmative duty to protect from its own
forces and the forces of an allied host state. Because of this
affirmative duty, a third-party state could not target other military
objectives if such targeting would result in collateral damage to
commanders or their subordinates involved in indigenous dispute
resolution.
E. Challenges Posed by New Targeting Techniques and Technology
The implied-safe conduct approach creates special challenges in
two areas that have recently attracted attention: signature strikes
and autonomous systems. Each will be discussed in turn.

(forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2241770 (discussing the
importance of symbols and other means that clearly separate military targets from
civilian persons and property).
174.
See Margulies, The Fog of War, supra note 4, at 1423-29 (discussing LOAC
norms).
175.
One could argue that granting even limited immunity to commanders who
do part-time duty in religious courts gives those tribunals a patina of legitimacy and
therefore aids insurgents' struggle against the host government that a third-party
state is seeking to assist. However, this argument does not fully consider how
legitimacy is gained and lost in NIACs. While refraining from targeting commanders in
religious courts may provide some incremental increase in legitimacy, the inverse
proposition is manifestly inaccurate: Targeting those commanders during their service
in religious courts does not reduce their legitimacy. Rather, by showing disdain for the
"social capital" of indigenous communities, such targeting decreases the legitimacy of
the host government and the third-party state. Cf. COIN MANUAL, supra note 13, at ch.
3, § 61 (noting the importance of preserving social capital). The host government can
enhance its own legitimacy only by standing up its own dispute-resolution processes.
As COIN doctrine suggests, the third-party state has an important role to play in
supporting and protecting those efforts.

1074

1.

VANDERBILTJOURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL, 46:1041

Signature Strikes

The implied-safe conduct approach has ramifications for the use
of so-called signature strikes. Signature strikes are strikes in which a
drone operator targets individuals or a group without knowledge of
some or all of the targets' identities. Instead of knowing a particular
individual's history and course of conduct, the operator looks for a
behavioral "signature."176 For example, if a group of young, adult men
not in uniform is massing together in the early morning hours in the
FATA, each bearing arms, and heading in the direction of a village
known to be under the control of the host-state's government, the
drone operator may determine that the men are members of Al
Qaeda, the Taliban, or an associated force such as the Haqqani
Network. Based on this determination, the operator will target the
group.
There is nothing inherently unlawful in the use of signature
strikes. After all, in traditional conflicts among states, groups were
regularly targeted when the targeter had no knowledge of their
specific identities.' 7 7 Such targeting complies with the principle of
distinction, which simply requires a reasonable belief on the part of
the targeter that the target is part of the opposing force engaged in a
CCF or is at the time of the strike a civilian who is DPH. 7 8 In such
conflicts, other indicia of combatancy, such as wearing an enemy
uniform, provided enough identifying information to justify targeting
under LOAC. 179 In principle, the same rule applies to men not
wearing uniforms in the service of Al Qaeda or an associated force.
Requiring exact knowledge of each target's identity would create a
perverse incentive, rewarding those who ignore the law of war's

176.
See DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE
SOUL OF THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY 41 (2012) (reporting on the "targeting of groups of

men who bear certain signatures, or defining characteristics associated with terrorist
activity, but whose identities aren't necessarily known"); Kevin Jon Heller, 'One Hell of
a Killing Machine'.-SignatureStrikes and InternationalLaw, 11 J. INTL CRIM. JUSTICE
89, 98-99 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2169089 (conceding that strikes
based on certain conduct, such as participation in a terrorist training camp, would be
consistent with LOAC, while asserting that targeting "military-age males" present in
an area identified as a training camp would violate the principle of distinction absent
further evidence that targets were DPH). For reasons discussed in this Article, I
believe Heller's reading of the principle of distinction is unduly strict. The implied-safe
conduct approach, which I concede is lex ferenda, would require greater care in certain
contexts than the principle of distinction currently mandates.
177.
See Geoffrey S. Corn et al., Belligerent Targeting and the Invalidity of a
Least Harmful Means Rule, 89 INT'L L. STUD. 536, 562-63 (2013) (discussing statusbased targeting in traditional armed conflicts).
178.
See id. (explaining that during an armed conflict "the collective nature of
the enemy belligerent forces justifies a conclusive presumption that all individuals
falling within that status represent a threat").
179.
See id. (recognizing the broad nature of this status-based attack authority).
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traditional requirement that fighters wear identifying insignia and
carry arms openly. 80
However, the lack of precise knowledge of a target's identity can
heighten the risk of false positives-people targeted even though they
actually are not a part of an opposing force. Consider the scene
described above of young, armed men congregating. That group could
be assembling to go to a jirga at the village, carrying arms only for
protection against bandits. Other explanations are possible as well.
However, requiring that participants in a jirga distinguish
themselves will reduce the risk of false positives. Nevertheless,
particular situations may still be ambiguous, imposing a duty on the
drone pilot to obtain more information.
2.

Autonomous Systems

This caution is also in order for the use of autonomous systems.
Autonomous systems are computerized targeting systems that do
their work without real-time human guidance.18 The United States
has already installed autonomous systems in certain narrow
applications, such as on naval vessels vulnerable to incoming
ordnance. 182 Critics have charged that the deployment of autonomous
systems against people is inherently a violation of the law of war
because autonomous systems are incapable of the fine-grained
discrimination that is expected from human beings. An implied safe
conduct for informal dispute resolution would require some
adjustments in the deployment of autonomous systems.
Without adjustments, the autonomous system could spawn false
positives as readily as a drone. If a human drone operator could be
fooled by the group of young, armed men described above, a
computerized targeter could also be deceived. Commanders would
have to guard against mistakes by ensuring that the autonomous

180.

Cf. Laurie R. Blank, Finding Facts But Missing the Law: The Goldstone

Report, Gaza and Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 279, 289-93 (2010) (critiquing
the flawed incentives created by the UN report that condemned the state without
acknowledging the wrongdoing of the terrorist group that concealed military objectives
in civilian areas).
181.
See Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous

Weapons Systems: Why a Ban Won't Work and How the Laws of War Can, HOOVER INST.
JEAN PERKINS TASK FORCE ON NAT'L SECURITY & L. 1 (2013), available at
http://media.hoover.org/sites/defaultfiles/documents/Anderson-WaxmanLawAndEthics
5R_FINAL.pdf (defining autonomous weapon systems as ones that "can select and engage
targets without further intervention by a human operator"); Michael N. Schmitt &

Jeffrey S. Thurnher, "Out of the Loop": Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Law of
Armed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT'L SECURITY J. 231, 235 (2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2212188 (autonomous weapons have the "capability to
identify, target and attack a person or object without human interface").
182.
See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 181, at 235 (providing that the United
States has operated "two 'human-supervised' autonomous systems for many years - the
Aegis at sea, and the Patriot on land").
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system was- programmed to recognize distinguishing markings for
participation in indigenous dispute resolution. They would also have
to program the system to recognize ambiguity and to seek more
information or request human guidance in ambiguous situations.
This does not mean that autonomous systems could not be used, but
it would highlight the need for care in implementation.
V. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS

As with any proposal for change, there are a legion of objections.
One can argue that the implied-safe conduct proposal will prompt
hindsight bias against commanders and thereby chill legitimate
targeting. This is a powerful concern.
In certain situations, the proposal will require that commanders
make very fine-grained decisions. The clearest example is a decision
about who is "about to surrender." In armed conflict, commanders in
a difficult position may well contemplate surrender or cease-fire along
with other options. However, the history of armed conflict teaches
that some of the heaviest fighting occurs just before a truce, as
adversaries jockey for position.' 83 Handling an adversary with kid
gloves during this period could be a recipe for unilateral concessions,
selling short one's own position. It would be unfair, according to this
argument, to subject commanders to this kind of dilemma.
On balance, however, this is not a persuasive argument in the
COIN context. It is true that non-state actors may seek to maximize
their military advantage just before a truce or even use a truce to
rebuild their forces. However, state forces under this proposal would
not be helpless to resist such efforts. They could continue to target
non-state forces actively engaged in hostilities or visibly preparing for
them by massing near a military objective. The implied-safe conduct
proposal would simply require reasonable efforts to spare a
commander whose forces were docile upon receipt of reasonably
reliable information, including an adversary's use of distinguishing
markings, that the commander was about to agree to a truce. That
requirement will necessarily cut into the discretion provided
commanders, but not enough to undermine the effectiveness of state
forces.
Another objection is that a rule that those participating in
alternative dispute resolution are not DPH while they are engaged in
this pursuit would be sufficient. However, that view is also
misguided. Even though a state cannot target a civilian who is not

183.

See Donald W. Boose, Jr., Fighting While Talking: The Korean War Truce

Talks, 14(3) OAH MAGAZINE OF HISTORY 25, 27 (2000) (noting the threats by U.S.

officials in negotiations during the Korean War to escalate the conflict unless China
and North Korea accepted the UN's offer).
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DPH, that civilian can still end up as permissible collateral damage
under the proportionality principle. That does not provide sufficient
protection for the cultural and social work that alternative dispute
resolution represents. Greater protection is necessary.
VI. CONCLUSION
The clash between LOAC and human rights law has played out
in many arenas recently. It is tempting to resolve the tension with an
either-or approach. The preemptive model chooses LOAC. The
protective view prioritizes human rights. Neither has the nuance to
do justice to the complexities of today's NIACs involving third-party
states, host states, and non-state actors. The stewardship view
advanced here aims to bridge the gap, requiring greater care in
targeting when a third-party state might adversely affect indigenous
informal dispute resolution.
On the view expressed here, human rights law protects informal
dispute resolution as a precious form of cultural property. Preserving
this form of property can aid a transition from a regime of chaos or
rebellion to one of accommodation between the host state and its
people. Protection of informal dispute-resolution processes like jirgas
can help achieve this goal without the wholesale constraints on
targeting favored by the protective view.
Stewardship achieves this objective through expansion of the
venerable concept of implied safe conduct. Typically, safe conducts
have rested on the consent of both parties. However, safe conducts
can also be created by the operation of customary or treaty law. The
modest change of expanding implied safe conducts when an adversary
uses distinguishing markings connoting resort to indigenous dispute
resolution can produce significant benefits.
As is always the case, those benefits are not cost free.
Commanders may be constrained in some situations, particularly
when the protection outlined here precludes targeting commanders of
opposing forces or significant groups of armed enemy combatants
participating in informal dispute resolution. Defenders of the
preemptive view might prefer to leave the option of greater protection
where it currently resides, with the discretion of commanders.
However, that regime has also created costs, such as bitterness
among local communities when targeters fail to exercise sufficient
care. A rule requiring protection when prospective targets or civilians
in the immediate vicinity use distinguishing markings will alleviate
the acrimony that such strikes cause, while preserving much of the
discretion that commanders require in an armed conflict.

